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THE IMPACT OF CAMPAIGN DONATION SOURCES ON ELECTION 
OUTCOMES: DONATIONS FROM WITHIN THE  
CANDIDATE’S DISTRICT 
ADELAINE REYNOLDS 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study seeks to examine the relationship between the percentage of campaign 
donations coming from within a candidate’s constituency and his likelihood of 
winning the election, as well as look at the reasons for the existence of that 
relationship. This is accomplished by performing a logistic regression analysis of 
likelihood of winning against total percentage donations coming from sources 
within the candidate’s district for 172 House candidates, followed by a series of 
case studies intended to allow for deeper examination into why this is the case. 
Findings indicate that there is no significant relationship between the percentage 
of donations from the constituency and the candidate’s success and proposes that 
this is likely due to lack of voter awareness of how a candidate’s campaign is 
funded due to the media neglecting to address the subject adequately or 
accurately. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Campaign finance has become an increasingly popular topic for news 
coverage. Whether it is PAC money or “big money donors,” people are starting to 
concern themselves with who is financing the campaigns of candidates they may 
end up voting for. Some of the press is likely generated by the many contenders 
for the 2020 Presidential election making promises to not accept money from 
certain groups,1,2 but they would not bring attention to it if they did not know that 
it is starting to be something that voters look to in order to gain information on 
candidates and who’s interests they might be representing. When you see a 
headline like “Only 13 Mainers gave $200 or more to Susan Collins in the latest 
quarter,” 3 and realize that out of the $1.1 million in donations Collins has received 
for the 2020 Senate election, less than 1% came from her home state of Maine, it 
can be concerning; assuming that money represents support, it is hard to see why 
only 1% of that support should be coming from the very people an elected official 
represents. Yet, most people would not know what a “normal” amount of 
                                                        
1 Peter Overby, “Democratic Presidential Candidates Say 'No' To Corporate PAC Money,” NPR, 
Feb 1, 2019 
2 MJ Lee, “Elizabeth Warren's new promise: No fundraisers, phone calls with wealthy donors,” 
CNN, February 25, 2019. 
3 Simone Pathé, “Only 13 Mainers gave $200 or more to Susan Collins in the latest quarter,” Roll 
Call, Apr 8, 2019. 
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donations from within a candidate’s district might be, or how to interpret that 
information. How would you feel if you found out that most of the monetary 
support received by your Congressman came from outside of your own district? 
Whose interests are really at play here? 
This study examines this aspect of the role of donation source by observing 
whether the percentage of funding from sources within a candidate’s constituency 
plays a role in election outcome for that candidate. In effect, it seeks to determine 
if a higher percentage of donations from within the constituency has a positive, 
negative, or no impact on whether or not the candidate wins. Assuming local 
donors have interests due to policy impact on their community, while non-local 
donors have external interests (such as maintaining a red or blue seat or a 
particular policy stance that would benefit them), if campaigns that are funded by 
primarily sources outside of their constituency see more success than those that 
are locally funded, it indicates that there is an aspect beyond the vote of a 
constituent that is influencing elections. In order to assess this role, I first identify 
the relationship between percentage of campaign donations coming from within 
the candidate’s constituency and if they won their election. This is followed by a 
set of case studies that allows for deeper exploration as to why this relationship 
may exist, and to briefly address the voter psychology that could be playing a role 
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in this relationship in the context of specific races. Ultimately, this study seeks to 
identify the impact of campaign donations from inside a candidate’s district on his 
chances of winning the election, and produce potential reasons for why this effect 
can be seen. 
 
CAMPAIGN FUNDING 
The majority of the literature currently available seeks to look at campaign 
donation source on a larger scale. Examination of raw data available from the FEC 
requires no study to comprehend; candidates who have more money do better in 
their elections than their less-funded opponents. On this note, money has been 
shown to play an essential role in the ability of a candidate to put up a fight against 
an opponent, and having more of it is shown to be beneficial.4 Higher levels of 
spending allows for increased public appearances, more materials such as signs, 
commercials, and other means of increasing the candidate’s visibility, which 
generally contributes positively to a candidate’s likelihood of winning. 5,6 
                                                        
4 Gary C. Jacobson, “Money and votes reconsidered: congressional elections, 1972–1982,” Public 
Choice (1985) 47: 7. doi: 10.1007/BF00119352 
5 Gary C. Jacobson, “The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections,” American 
Political Science Review 72, no. 2 (1978): 469–91. doi:10.2307/1954105. 
6 Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for 
Old Arguments," American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 2 (1990): 334-62. 
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The policy regulating donations is the most commonly studied factor 
regarding the role of campaign finance on election outcomes, some of which 
briefly touches on source in some manner. Limits on donations have been found 
to play a significant role in election outcomes,7 which pertains to source in that 
they are regulated based on what the source is. More attention is paid to sources 
in general groups broken down by their legislative designations used to set the 
limits: party, PAC, individual.8 Statistically significant, positive correlations have 
been identified for PACs and individual donations, with PAC contributions show 
a slightly higher effect,9 demonstrating that there is more at play then merely the 
total sum of all of the donations made to a candidate in whether or not he or she 
succeeds in winning the election.  
 Attention has also been given to the size of donations, claiming that both 
parties rely upon “big money” donors (donations of a larger value) more than 
                                                        
7 John R. Lott, Jr., "Campaign Finance Reform and Electoral Competition," Public Choice 129, no. 3-
4 (2006): 263-300. DOI:10.1007/s11127-006-9028-x 
8 More recently, Super PAC has been added as a designation resulting from the Citizens United v. 
FEC and the SpeechNOW.org v. FEC rulings of 2010, but because Super PACS are not allowed to 
contribute or coordinate directly with candidates and their campaigns, they will not be addressed 
in this study, it looks only at campaign contributions 
9 Craig A. Depken, "The Effects of Campaign Contribution Sources on the Congressional 
Elections of 1996," Economics Letters 58, no. 2 (1998): 211-15. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-
1765(97)00266-8 
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smaller grassroots donations,10 and that donations from these “big money” donors 
tend to be more due to ideological agreement between themselves and the 
candidate rather than for specific political benefits.11 Local donors are generally not 
“big money” donors,12 and likely have a vested interest in the district rather than 
being in ideological agreement with a candidate. Voters living within a district are 
more likely to be attuned to their specific needs rather than ideologies, so outside 
donors providing funding in order to promote their ideologies rather than specific 
needs could potentially be work against a candidate trying to gain popular 
support from his constituents by merely demonstrating alignment with 
community interests and desire to promote policy advantageous to his 
constituency. 
 
VOTER PSYCHOLOGY AND CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE 
 There is a gap in literature pertaining to voters’ views on donation source, 
and pieces that do examine it tend to look at it from a voter psychology perspective 
                                                        
10 Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, "Why Hasn't Democracy 
Slowed Rising Inequality?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, (2013) 27 (3): 103-24.DOI: 
10.1257/jep.27.3.103 
11 Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. De Figueredo, and James M. Snyder. 2003. “Why is There 
So Little Money in US Politics?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(1): 105-30. 
12 “FEC Reports on Financial Activity U.S. Senate and House Campaigns : Final Report.” 
Washington, D.C. :Federal Election Commission, n.d. 
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rather than an impact-based, outcome-oriented assessment. Moreover, the 
majority of the few pieces that look at donation source tend to approach it from 
the angle of impact of campaign finance disclosure (or nondisclosure), which does 
provide insight into the candidate side of campaign finance source, but does little 
to provide information on the voters.  
Findings indicate that data on campaign finance that is available to voters 
offers too much information that is of little value and relevancy to those 
attempting to figure out the source of donations and what interest groups could 
potentially be offering their financial support, potentially in order to benefit their 
own interests.13,14 The same study also found that when voters were given 
information with obvious cues that demonstrated support by interest groups, 
particularly those working against causes that the voter supported, there was a 
decidedly negative impact on voter support. When voters are made explicitly 
aware of donation source, it has been shown to have significant effect on candidate 
support, but it has also been determined that voters rarely dig for this data, and 
primarily rely on the media and watchdog groups to provide them with 
                                                        
13 Elizabeth Garrett and Daniel A. Smith, “Rules, Politics, and Policy,” Election Law Journal 4.4 
(Nov 2005): 234. doi:1089/elj.2005.4.295 
14 After spending over twenty hours sifting through FEC data on campaign contributions to 
candidates in order to pull specific information on the entities donating, I have come to the same 
conclusion as these authors 
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information on the candidates that may sway their vote.15 Due to little and even 
inaccurate media focus on this topic,16 this effectively means that in practice, voters 
are unaware of (and thus not influenced by) where funding comes from. This has 
serious implications for the significance of this information in voter decision-
making as well as eventual legislative composition—knowledge of campaign 
funding source changes voter opinions, and thus election outcomes, but voters are 
unaware of who is influencing them due to lack of attention from the media, and 
even if they attempt search for this data themselves, will encounter difficulty 
finding the information necessary to determine who is behind the donations. 
Garrett and Smith’s explanation of the significance of disclosure statutes does a 
superb job of capturing why it is important for voters to be aware of where funding 
is coming from, indicating that in addition to offering more information on 
campaign activity and allowing voters to better evaluate candidates, it helps to 
prevent instances of quid pro quo occurrences or accusations.17 While this is 
specifically referring to disclosure statements, it follows the same line of thought 
                                                        
15 Conor M. Dowling and Amber Wichowsky, “Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain? 
Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure,” American 
Politics Research 41 (2013): 965-996. DOI: 10.1177/1532673X13480828 
16 Stephen Ansolabehere, Erik C. Snowberg, James M. Snyder, “Unrepresentative Information: 
The Case of Newspaper Reporting on Campaign Finance,” Public Opinion Quarterly 69, Issue 2 
(2005):213–231. doi:10.1093/poq/nfi022 
17 Garrett and Smith, pp. 299-300 
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regarding voter awareness of funding source. It brings up the important factor of 
potential quid pro quo arrangements, which adds another element to concerns 
about adherence to democratic values. While quid pro quo arrangements are 
illegal,18 they can be fairly easily masked, particularly if donation sources cannot 
be easily identified by those who are likely to be most concerned—the people who 
are being represented by the official on the receiving end. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
 Combining the insights about campaign funding with voter psychology 
leads me to the hypothesis that a higher percentage of outside money would mean 
lower levels of support for a candidate within his district due to a general 
sensitivity to the influence of outsiders and voters’ desire to feel that they have 
elected the candidate that best understands the needs of their district, providing 
the following model: 
H0= A higher percentage of funds coming from donors inside 
the district has no significant impact on election outcomes 
 
H1= A higher percentage of funds coming from donors inside 
the district has a significant positive impact on election 
outcomes 
 
                                                        
18 As determined by 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (also known as the Hobbes Act) and 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006)  
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This conjecture follows the reasoning that more monetary support from inside the 
district would suggest to voters that the community itself harbors support for the 
candidate, which is indicative of an alignment in policy preferences, leading voters 
to favor said candidate.  That said, I am hesitant to claim that the quantitative 
model will provide evidence supporting my hypothesis due to voter reliance on 
the media to provide them with information on candidates up for election, 
including information on their campaign funding sources—which reportedly is 
not very common. Without voter awareness, it is unlikely that there will be an 
impact, and if there is, I will need to examine the role of factors outside the media 
as sources of voter information. I anticipate stronger evidence in support of H1 in 
the case study portion where I am able to specifically examine media influence 
and voter response. 
 
METHODS 
Part 1: Quantitative 
 In order to assess whether or not percentage of campaign donations coming 
from within a candidate’s district could be related to the candidate’s election 
outcome, I run a regression analysis to see if there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the independent variable, higher percentages of constituent-
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sourced campaign donations, and the dependent variable, the candidate winning 
their election. In order to assess this relationship, I use a logistic regression 
analysis, chosen due to the desire to observe the impact of an interval variable 
(percentage of campaign funds from sources within the district) on a binary 
nominal variable (win or lose). This is also taken a step further with a second round 
of regressions, also using a logistic regression, but with the data set broken down 
by party in order to see if there is a stronger relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables in one party than the other. 
 
Data Selection: 
 Data from U.S. House of Representatives general elections was chosen 
because it is a set of elections deciding representation at the federal level that is 
tied to distinct, particular districts. There is a specific geographic area that is tied 
to each House seat election, making it simple to determine what counts as a 
candidate’s constituency and what does not. The election years 2004, 2006, and 
2008 were chosen in order to ensure that the entire election period fell within the 
laws set forth by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, but before the 
Citizen’s United ruling that allowed for the creation of Super PACs, which offered 
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a way to get around individual donation limits by not donating directly to a 
candidate’s campaign. 
Data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) is used due to the 
mandatory reporting required by candidates, which guarantees that all individual 
donations to a candidate are accounted for. These donation records are tagged 
with the full address of the donor, including zip code. By cross checking the donor 
zip code against the zip codes within the candidate’s constituency using the official 
districting data from the U.S. Census Bureau, I am able to determine whether the 
donation is sourced from within or outside the district and tag it as such. 
A number of studies have shown that there is significant advantage for an 
incumbent candidate,19,20,21 so in order to prevent this from influencing results by 
any means, only open seat races were considered. With the three years of elections 
(2004, 2006, and 2008) considered and the availability of FEC data, 172 House 
election candidates are assessed. Note also that only candidates from the two 
major parties, Democrat and Republican, are considered in this analysis since in 
                                                        
19Robert S. Erikson, "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections," Polity 3, no. 3 
(1971): 395-405. doi: 10.2307/3234117 
20 Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz, "Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections 
Grow?" American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (1996): 478. 
21 Albert D. Cover, "One Good Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in 
Congressional Elections," American Journal of Political Science 21, no. 3 (1977): 523-41. 
doi:10.2307/2110580 
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the selected races, no independent candidates garnered a significant (over 10%) of 
the vote.22 
 
Controls: 
In order to ensure that other factors do not influence the results, several 
potential confounding variables are controlled for. Since party has been shown to 
be the leading indicator for how people vote, it will be controlled for in the initial 
regression examining all of the candidates.23 In the second round of regressions 
broken down by party, this will no longer require control since all of the 
candidates being evaluated will be members of the same party. This will be the 
only control that is dropped for the second round or regression analysis. Another 
variable relating to party will control for the party of the previous Representative 
elected in the district to ensure that if the district is a stronghold of one party and 
would therefore create a partisan influence on the election outcome beyond merely 
the effect of the parties of the current candidates, it will not have an impact upon 
                                                        
22 “FEC Reports on Financial Activity U.S. Senate and House Campaigns : Final Report.” 
Washington, D.C. :Federal Election Commission, n.d. 
23 Larry M. Bartels, "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996," American Journal of Political 
Science 44, no. 1 (2000): 35-50. doi:10.2307/2669291 
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the analysis results.24 Year will be controlled for since 2004 and 2008 are 
Presidential elections as well, which could potentially have an impact on 
campaign donation patterns in comparison to the 2006 midterm election. This will 
be included in the form of dummy variables for the years 2004 and 2006 since it is 
a categorical variable that Stata would otherwise interpret as an interval due to its 
numerical value; 2008 is discarded since including all three dummy variables 
would be redundant. Gender of a candidate has also been shown to impact voter 
evaluation of a candidate, therefore it will be controlled for in both rounds of 
regressions.25,26,27 The final control will be the overall dollar value of individual 
contributions received, since research has demonstrated that candidates with 
larger war chests tend to be more likely to win than their opponents with more 
limited financial resources.28,29,30  
                                                        
24 Andrew Gelman, Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State Why Americans Vote the Way They Do, 
Expanded ed. (Princeton, N.J. ; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
25 Richard L. Fox and Zoe M. Oxley, "Gender Stereotyping in State Executive Elections: Candidate 
Selection and Success," The Journal of Politics 65, no. 3 (2003): 833-50. doi: 10.1111/1468-2508.00214 
26 Koch, Jeffrey W. "Candidate Gender and Assessments of Senate Candidates." Social Science 
Quarterly 80, no. 1 (1999): 84-96 
27 Leonie Huddyand Nayda Terkildsen, "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and 
Female Candidates," American Journal of Political Science 37, no. 1 (1993): 119-47. 
doi:10.2307/2111526 
28 Jacobson, 1978. 
29 Jacobson, 1985. 
30 Jacobson, 1990. 
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The final dataset will contain all 172 candidates tagged for the independent 
variable of percentage of campaign donations from sources within the candidate’s 
constituency (% value between 0 and 100) and the dependent variable, election 
outcome (win or loss), as well as the control variables: party (Democrat or 
Republican), party stronghold (party sitting congressman is the same or different 
as candidate’s party), year (2004, 2006, or 2008), total amount of donations (dollar 
value), and gender (male or female). This will ultimately produce this logistic 
regression model: 
Logged Odds (win) = a + b1 (% of donations from sources within 
district) + b2 (party) + b3 (party stronghold) + b4 (year 2004) + b5 (year 
2006) + b6 (gender) + b7(total donations) 
 
The second round of regressions will produce a similar model: 
Logged Odds (win) = a + b1 (% of donations from sources within 
district) + b2 (party stronghold) + b3 (year 2004) + b4(year 2006) + 
b5(gender) + b6(total donations) 
 
Data Collection: 
 Data for this portion is acquired by pulling all records of individual 
donations to a candidate from the FEC database. Individual donation reports 
require the donor’s address, including their zip code. The zip code of each donor 
is then cross-referenced with a list of every zip code in the district of the candidate 
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running for office. If the donor’s zip code is on that list, the amount they donated 
is listed as being “in-district.” Once each donation is marked “in-district” or not, I 
add together all of the donation amounts of the donors marked as “in-district” to 
get the total sum of a candidate’s donations coming from within his district. I then 
add together all of the candidate’s donations, both those marked “in-distroct” and 
not in order to get the total amount of all of the candidate’s reported individual 
contributions. In order to calculate the percentage of donations coming from 
sources within the candidate’s district, I divide the amount of “in-district” 
donations by the total of all donations. This action is completed for each of the 172 
candidates. 
 
Part 2: Qualitative 
In order to explore the phenomenon of campaign donation sources from a 
more voter-oriented perspective, a qualitative analysis will be performed in 
addition to the previously explained work. While the quantitative section seeks to 
identify the relationship between campaign donation source and winning an 
election, the case study section of this project will aim for a deeper exploration into 
the possibilities of campaign-funding source affecting election outcome in specific 
situations rather than generalized analysis. I have three criteria that I am looking 
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at specifically: 1) amount and type of media coverage with regard to campaign 
funding sources of the candidate; 2) public discussion about the topic of campaign 
funding; and 3) the candidate’s attention to his funding sources. By assessing each 
case in terms of these criteria, I hope to gain a deeper, and perhaps more causal 
understanding of why sources of campaign funding impact election outcomes the 
way they do. Moreover, this will provide insight into the experience of a citizen 
participating in the election in that it will be observable not only how much 
information is provided, but the amount of attention given that would be likely to 
cause a voter to consider the topic of campaign funding sources at all. Case 
selection is based upon availability of sources, percentages of donations from 
within the district, and media coverage. Elections with no media coverage will not 
be considered since there is no way to assess the impact or attribute the role of 
campaign donation sources in the election outcome. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Part 1: Quantitative 
Before examining the results of the regressions, it is valuable to observe the 
statistical summary of the independent variable, particularly for the two parties in 
order to see whether there are any baseline differences that would be important to 
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note. The mean and standard deviations of the percentage of donations from 
sources within the candidate’s district, as well as the median and 25th and 75th 
percentiles are shown in Table 1 below: 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for % In-District Donations 
  All Democrats Republicans 
    
Mean 44.13% 42.02% 46.34% 
Std. Dev. 20.95% 21.71% 20.01% 
    
25% 25.21% 24.95% 30.05% 
50% (median) 43.51% 39.86% 46.25% 
75% 59.13% 55.32% 61.44% 
    
Observations 172 88 84 
 
While one might assume there would be a difference in the percentage of 
donations from in-district sources between parties, the mean and standard 
deviations are relatively even across the samples, which provides a solid baseline 
for statistical comparison. The Republicans see a slight increase in their percentile 
spread in comparison to the other samples, with values about 6% higher than 
Democrats for the median, 25th, and 75th percentiles. One might assume that these 
percentages might be higher for Republicans, since they are generally more likely 
to emphasize their local connections since conservatives generally support 
government power shifting away from larger bodies (i.e. federal and state) in favor 
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of local governance, which would mean they are likely more interested in a 
politician’s ability to demonstrate faith in his constituents, which could be 
demonstrated by their monetary support. Alternatively, one might assume 
Republicans would have higher levels of in-district donations because those with 
higher incomes are more likely to identify themselves as Republican,31  thus 
Republican-dominated districts are more likely to have higher numbers of people 
with more disposable income that could be directed towards their candidate’s 
campaign. Despite this fact, the summary statistics indicate that there is only 
minimal difference between the two parties, a factor to keep in mind when 
assessing the party differences in the results of the logistic regressions. 
 To rule out the notion that number of wins might influence the results, I 
also want to note the number of wins broken down by party, as shown in Table 2: 
Table 2: Number of Races Won 
  All Democrats Republicans 
    
Wins 87 44 43 
Losses 85 44 41 
    
Win % 50.58% 50.00% 51.12% 
    
Observations 172 88 84 
 
                                                        
31 “Independents Take Center Stage in Obama Era: Trends in Political Values and Core Attitudes: 
1987-2009.” Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (May 21, 2009). 
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Even across three elections, one of which saw a change in party control of the 
House from Republican to Democrat, both parties see a win approximately half 
the time. This could potentially rule out concerns about differing odds due solely 
to a higher likelihood of one party winning more often within the dataset. 
In order to best assess whether or not percentage of campaign donations 
coming from within a candidate’s district could be related to the candidate’s 
election outcome, I ran a logistic regression with the independent variable “% 
Donations In-District” and the dependent variable “win.” To gauge if party played 
any role in these trends, in addition to the full sample including all of the 
candidates in each party, I also ran separate regressions for only the Democrats 
and only the Republicans. All three regressions were run with the variables party 
stronghold, year 2004, year 2006, gender, and total donations controlled for, and 
the first regression, including all 172 of the candidates, was additionally controlled 
for party.32 The results of these regressions can be seen below in Table 3:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
32 Explanation of these controls can be found in the “Controls” portion of the Methods section 
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Table 3: Logistic regression of a candidate’s odds of winning against  
the % donations from inside the candidate’s district (controls included) 
  All Democrats Republicans 
    
% Donations In-District .201 -2.651 2.320 
 (.990) (1.792) (1.434) 
p-value .839 .139 .106 
 
Party (0=R) 1.300** n/a n/a 
 (.491)   
Party Stronghold (0=Same)33 -2.542** -4.424** -2.675** 
 (.483) (1.055) (.796) 
Year 2004 .266 -2.094* 1.976* 
 (.467) (.981) (.812) 
Year 2006 .035 -.105 .174 
 (.453) (.725) (.645) 
Gender (0=Male) -.664 -1.655* -.627 
 (.437) (.724) (.762) 
Total Donations34 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -.443 4.087 -1.848 
 (.768) (1.587) (1.040) 
    
 
Observations 172 88 84 
                                                        
33 While not the subject of this study, it is extremely interesting and counter to popular 
understanding that a “party stronghold” (here referring to the most recent former-
Representative’s party matching that of the candidate) would have a negative impact upon the 
odds of a candidate winning the race. As previously addressed in the review of the literature, this 
pattern often follows the pattern of incumbency in that those with the same party as the previous 
legislator generally have a better chance at winning. Perhaps it is the year or the circumstance 
that creates this situation in this data set, but it would be worth exploring since it falls outside of 
what is understood to be the norm. 
34 “Total donations” was able to be controlled for using this model, but as an interval variable 
with extremely high values (well over a million in many circumstances), its overall impact of its 
variation resulted in a very small odds coefficient despite its significance. The 0.000 coefficient 
resulting from this model should NOT be interpreted as evidence that total donation amount has 
no impact upon a candidate’s odds of winning. 
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Standard error is reported in parentheses.35 
Significance: *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
In Table 3, I have bolded the “% Donations In-District” variable in order to 
differentiate it from the controls below it. The first regression statistics listed, 
“All,” used data from all 172 candidates in office. It produced the following model: 
 
Logged Odds (win) = -.443 + .201(% of donations from sources within 
district) + 1.300(party) – 2.542(party stronghold) + .266(year 2004) + 
.035(year 2006) - .664(gender) + 0.000(total donations) 
 
The model produced sets the logged odds coefficient for the independent variable 
at .201, indicating that within the data used, percentage of donations coming from 
inside the candidate’s district plays little role in the candidate’s odds of winning. 
More importantly, the independent variable is statistically insignificant, with an 
extremely high p-value of .839. This means that I am unable to reject the null 
hypothesis, as there is no evidence that the percentage of a candidate’s donations 
from sources within his district has a significant impact upon whether the 
candidate will win the election. 
                                                        
35 It is important to note that in all three of these regression models, there are relatively high 
standard errors, but it does not necessarily invalidate the model since this is likely due both to 
considerable variation across the sample as well as the somewhat small sample size, especially 
once broken down by party. A smaller n-value was preferable for this study, and explanation of 
the choice in sample can be seen in the “Data Selection” portion of the Methods section. 
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 Despite lack of statistical significance, observing the party-isolated models 
still provides interesting insight regarding the independent variable’s possible 
relationship with the candidate’s likelihood of winning, producing the following 
models: 
Democrats: 
Logged Odds (winDem) = 4.087 – 2.651(% of donations from sources 
within district) + - 4.434(party stronghold) - 2.094(year 2004) - 
.105(year 2006) – 1.655(gender) + 0.000(total donations) 
 
Republicans: 
Logged Odds (winRep) = -1.848 + 2.320(% of donations from sources 
within district) -2.675(party stronghold) + 1.976(year 2004) + 
.174(year 2006) - .627(gender) + 0.000(total donations) 
 
While the logged odds coefficient for the full dataset offers a relatively small 
positive value, there is an obvious change when the data is broken down by party: 
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Table 4: Odds from the logistic regression of a candidate’s odds of winning 
against the % donations from inside the candidate’s district (controls not 
displayed) 
  All Democrats Republicans 
    
Logged Odds .201 -2.651 2.320 
 (.990) (1.792) (1.434) 
Odds Ratio 1.223 0.071 10.141 
 (1.211) (.126) (14.532) 
    
p-value .839 .139 .106 
    
Observations 172 88 84 
Standard error is reported in parentheses. 
 
Not only does the logged odds coefficient of percentage of donations coming from 
inside the candidate’s district increase by tenfold for each party, there is a 
divergence in the direction; in this set of data, Democrats see a negative coefficient 
from a higher percentage of donations coming from inside the candidate’s district, 
while the Republicans see a positive coefficient. The earlier summary statistics 
showed that Republicans had similar rates as Democrats for the percentage of in-
district donations, which makes the fact that there is such a discrepancy between 
the coefficients of each party even more interesting. The p-vales of the results 
broken down by party also provide insight. While still not qualifying as 
statistically significant at .139 and .106, there is still a drastic difference from the p-
value from the results of the full dataset, even with half the sample size. This 
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indicates that either there is a stronger relationship with percentage of donations 
coming from inside the candidate’s district and a candidate’s chances of winning 
by party, or that there are other factors at play.  
 
Part 2: Qualitative 
The purpose of the qualitative section of this study is to allow me to dig deeper 
into the mechanisms behind the impact of the independent variable, percentage of 
a candidate’s campaign donations coming from sources inside their district, on the 
dependent variable, election outcomes. While the quantitative section looked at 
general trends by using pooled data, here I will explore three specific elections and 
evaluate the role of in-district donations on the outcomes from the voter side. As 
previously mentioned, I will be specifically exploring the amount and type of 
media coverage relating to campaign funding sources of the candidate, public 
interest surrounding the topic of campaign funding, and the candidate’s attention 
to the funding sources of both he and his opponent. Cases were selected by 
characteristics and amount of available data, specifically media coverage of 
campaign donations. 
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Before addressing the specific cases, it is important that I establish general 
trends of attention to election funding in order to be able to address deviations.36 
In the case that donation sources become a topic of interest, it is usually generated 
by the media in relation to a particular large donor. While this is sometimes done 
to show the popularity of the candidate, it is more often than not a form of 
sensationalist media focused on scandals, i.e. a candidate has received a donation 
from a controversial figure or group, or at times a famous person (often from 
outside their district, and often from in the entertainment industry). Occasionally, 
candidates themselves will bring up the topic of campaign funding, though much 
like the media, this is usually to point out a potentially controversial donation that 
will make their opponent look bad. One could assume that this tactic would be 
avoided by candidates who perhaps also have questionable donation sources, 
which is likely why we see attention to donation source coming from the media 
more often than from another candidate. With regard to public opinion of this, I 
fall back on the research addressed in the previous review of the literature, 
                                                        
36 These trends were not identified from specific analyses, but rather from experiencing all of the 
elections in my lifetime, as well as gleaned from the hundreds of news reports I have read about 
this topic. While this may not be a particularly scientific way of approaching trends, which is 
why I feel it is important to note it as such, I feel that it does little to impact its legitimacy since 
the majority of trends identified here are general knowledge that most members of the field of 
political science or the general public that considers themselves “politically oriented” could also 
identify with no issue or research prior to giving an answer  
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meaning that if people are aware, it likely alters their opinion of a candidate, but 
as I found when investigating which cases to select, there is very little media 
coverage on this topic overall. 
 
Case 1:  
Illinois District 6, 2006: Tammy Duckworth(D)- 5.78% versus Peter Roskam(R)- 
46.84% 
 
Candidate Duckworth Roskam (winner) 
Total individual 
contributions $2,544,860.62 $2,135,088.04 
Funds from in-district 
donors $147,075.00 $1,000,038.04 
% of funds from district 5.78% 46.84% 
 
Local News Sources: Chicago Daily Herald, Chicago Tribune, Associated Press 
State & Local Wire, Chicago Sun-Times 
 
National News Sources: National Journal’s House Race Hotline, The Frontrunner, 
Human Events Online, National Public Radio 
 
This race poses a particularly unusual situation in that Candidate Tammy 
Duckworth only received 5.78% of her total individual donations from sources 
within her district.37 This falls within the bottom 10% of all candidates observed in 
                                                        
37 FEC 
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the quantitative portion for proportion of donations from in-district sources. This 
race was given national attention and was ultimately fairly close, with Peter 
Roskam winning with 52% of the vote. The candidates were fairly evenly matched 
in their overall individual donation amounts, which makes it even more important 
to note the discrepancies in percentage coming from within the district. 
Before moving forward, it is also important to emphasize that this race has 
a particular characteristic that offers an interesting lens through which I can 
observe the role of donations: Roskam ran a campaign around his long-time 
membership in the community and understanding of it, a sort of “home-grown” 
spirit, pointing out that Duckworth is taking advantage of the Illinois law that 
requires only that Representatives live in the state, but do not have to reside in the 
district they represent.38 This creates a particular dynamic that lends itself to an 
emphasis in reporting funding from outside the district in order to promote the 
image that Roskam has created of himself. 
There was a fair amount of media attention regarding sources of donations, 
particularly because Duckworth’s national attention seemed to be bringing in a lot 
of outside donors. Unlike general trends, some media reports addressed donations 
                                                        
38 Marni Pyke. "The next battle Duckworth ready to take on Roskam". Chicago Daily Herald. March 
23, 2006 Thursday. 
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from outside her district from “normal,” everyday-people with no amount of 
fame, and pointed out that even they were contributing to her campaign.39 In an 
interview, a donor from another state noted that she donated because “What 
happens in the 6th District of Illinois impacts the 4th District of Pennsylvania.”40  
This same article followed national trends, reporting that “the most competitive 
open seat races in Illinois, Colorado, Iowa and Arizona, Democrats raised more 
out-of-state money than Republicans by greater than a 4-to-1 margin.”41 This is 
interesting with regard to data found in the quantitative section, which reported 
that both parties had average outside-district donations of very close to 55%. That 
said, when the regression was run for only the Democrats, I found that a higher 
percentage of funds from within district had more of a positive impact and a 
higher significance than when it was run for only the Republicans.  
Duckworth also had some noteworthy donors such as Barbara Streisand, 
Bradley Whitford, and Rosie O’Donnell.42 It was interesting to see reporting on this 
without some commentary on how this is good or bad for the candidate, as is 
usually found with celebrity donors. With regard to bad press on donations, the 
                                                        
39 Jim Kuhnhenn. "Demos in open seat races in Colo elsewhere get outside help," The Associated 
Press State & Local Wire, August 26, 2006 Saturday.  
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid 
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Chicago Daily Herald took Duckworth’s lead as she pointed out that despite 
Roskam’s claims of being “pro-green,” he had accepted donations from a source 
in the middle of a water contamination suit.43 Roskam admitted to taking the 
donation but dismissed it as not important since he had received positive 
environmental ratings in the past. This exchange follows the general trend of 
candidates attempting to make their opponent look bad by pointing out 
potentially problematic donation sources. This falls into the category of a donation 
from someone with views that potentially conflict with the candidate’s expressed 
views, which opponents use to emphasize that their opponent may not be fully 
representing the interests that back them, and generally attempt to make voters 
wary of quid pro quo risks. Pointing out controversial donors was not limited to 
Duckworth; Roskam was slammed for a large contribution from an attorney 
linked to a federal corruption indictment,44 displaying the more common instance 
of pointing out a donor: attempting to make their opponent look bad but unrelated 
to policy. 
With regard to views of the district’s constituents, many seem to follow the 
line of thought drawn by Roskam, and consider Duckworth an outsider, a 
                                                        
43 Eric Krol. "Roskam challenged on environment Duckworth says challenger is pro-
'green'". Chicago Daily Herald. April 30, 2006 Sunday. 
44 "Slamming Back-And-Forth". National Journal's House Race Hotline. October 13, 2006, Friday.  
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“carpetbagger.”45 One Democratic constituent states that “powerful friends and an 
influx of cash don't translate into people who'll put up your signs,”46 This displays 
a powerful sentiment that easily comes up when outside donations are 
emphasized: money from outside the district does not mean support garnered 
from within. While total donations may have an overall positive impact upon the 
candidate’s performance,47 knowledge of outside support can deter voters, or 
make them feel like the candidate is more focused on needs outside the district 
than within. Particularly in a case like Duckworth, who lives outside her district, 
this can be very detrimental. Meanwhile, Roskam was able to tout his donations 
from “over 1,000 district residents.”48  
 
Case 2:  
New York District 24, 2006: Mike Arcuri(D)- 28.17% versus Ray Meier (R)- 54.35% 
 
Candidate Arcuri (winner) Meier 
Total individual 
contributions $1,154,043.96 $673,651.44 
Funds from in-district 
donors $325,042.66 $366,138.31 
% of funds from district 28.17% 54.35% 
 
                                                        
45 Pyke, 2006 
46 Ibid 
47 Jacobson, 1990. 
48 "IL6: Funds Are Building For Roskam, Duckworth". The Frontrunner. July 14, 2006 Friday.  
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Local News Sources: Utica Observer Dispatch, News 10 Now, The Binghampton 
Press & Sun Bulletin 
 
National News Sources: National Journal’s House Race Hotline, The Frontrunner, 
Human Events Online 
 
This race garnered interest due to particular media attention to the 
candidates’ campaign funding sources. Unlike the previous race where the media 
reported on the amount of funds coming from outside the district without 
condemnation, and really only reported on specific sources when it was brought 
up by the candidates, the media really took the lead on identifying donors in this 
race. While there is a clear difference in percentages of funds coming from inside 
the district, both candidates fall into the middle 50% of all candidates considered 
in the quantitative section. Mike Arcuri ultimately won this race with 54% of the 
vote, so still fairly narrow margins for a House race.49 He did hold the advantage 
in overall funds, with nearly twice as much received in total donations as Meier. 
As previously mentioned, media coverage of funding was fairly extensive 
with regard to donations both inside and outside the district. Arcuri came under 
fire for donations from a pollster whom he employed, though the pollster himself 
emphasized that he donated because of his relationship with Arcuri’s father, not 
                                                        
49 OpenSecrets, “New York District 24 2006 Race,”Center for Responsive Politics, Aug 20, 2007. 
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because of his party or policy leanings, or because he was being employed by the 
candidate.50 While this donation source was from within the NY24 district, the 
appearance of an exchange was still enough to incite media attention, displaying 
just how interested they were in this aspect of the race.  
Arcuri also came under fire for donations from a businessman who came 
under investigation by the FBI on felony charges.51 Not only this, but it appeared 
that this businessman had also perhaps used his employees as proxies in order to 
get around campaign finance laws that limited his donations.52 While a number of 
people came to Arcuri’s defense when he claimed no knowledge of the felony 
charges or questionable sources at the time of the donations, Arcuri ultimately 
returned the donations.53 This act really demonstrates the importance of donations 
in perception—if Arcuri was not aware of and worried about a possible negative 
impact coming from the press surrounding this incident, he likely would not have 
returned the donations. This is a testament to both the underlying role of the media 
in playing watchdog and directing peoples’ attention to this issue; attention to this 
                                                        
50 Robert B. Bluey. "Pollster John Zogby Is Also a Fundraiser". Human Events Online. August 28, 
2006 Monday. 
51 "Fishy Contributions?". National Journal's House Race Hotline. July 31, 2006, Monday.  
52 Ibid. 
53 "Don't Give Me Your Money, Please". National Journal's House Race Hotline. July 27, 2006, 
Thursday.   
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causes candidate reaction because of public perception, which in turn can be 
flipped to mean that lack of media attention plays a role in covering the potentially 
shady actions of candidates in accepting donations.  
Another area this is seen in is the policy arena. The media again paid 
attention to Arcuri’s donations, this time from people and groups supporting 
policy positions. The GOP critiqued Arcuri for donations from Barbara Streisand 
because “Streisand’s [policy] positions are way out of the mainstream in Upstate 
New York,”54  taking a more general tone and calling out outside influence that 
does not fall in line with what they would consider to be the opinions of the 
district. Arcuri also received thousands of dollars from both individuals and PACs 
known for their pro-choice stance on abortion.55 The same article also notes 
Arcuri’s extensive donations from areas outside the district, such as Los Angeles 
and San Francisco.56 It is also worth noting that this article comes from a 
particularly conservative source. I note this not to say that a bias might lead to 
misrepresentation, but rather to demonstrate that not only is this an opposition 
source pointing specifically to donations from a standpoint of opposing the policy 
                                                        
54 "NY24: GOP Blasts Arcuri Over Contribution From Streisand". The Frontrunner. September 14, 
2006 Thursday.  
55 Robert B. Bluey. "Liberal Interests at Work in Upstate N.Y.". Human Events Online. October 17, 
2006 Tuesday.  
56 Ibid 
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views of donors, but also to compare it back to the quantitative findings—higher 
in-district donations had a positive relationship with Republicans winning within 
the dataset “Republicans”, and they are often the ones who hold greater issue with 
the idea of donations coming from outside the district. This goes alongside their 
conservative roots, which generally favor more local representation and less 
involvement from more progressive entities seen to donate to Democratic 
campaigns—i.e. Hollywood. This agrees with the quantitative findings and allows 
for deeper questions to be asked: since higher proportions of in-district donations 
generally do help Republicans, do they critique Democrats’ higher percentages of 
outside-the-district because they are actually opposed to it or because they know 
that it could otherwise potentially be helpful to Democrats? 
 
Case 3:  
Minnesota District 3, 2008: Ashwin Madia(D)- 24.16% versus Erik Paulsen(R)- 
69.07%  
 
Candidate Madia Paulsen (winner) 
Total individual 
contributions $1,672,494.80 $1,744,141.46 
Funds from in-district 
donors $404,144.46 $1,187,215.54 
% of funds from district 24.16% 68.07% 
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Local News Sources: The Minnesota Independent, Minneapolis Star Tribune, 
Associated Press State & Local Wire, MNblue, Minnesota Public Radio, Twin 
Cities Pioneer Press, MinnPost, Minnesoda Daily 
 
National News Sources: Politico 
 
While still not at the same level as the Duckworth versus Roskam race, The 
MN3 race of 2008 still sees a considerable difference in proportions of in-district 
funding, with Madia falling into the bottom quarter of all candidates considered 
and Paulsen falling into the top. This race has an interesting aspect that is worth 
immediately noting: Madia emphasized early on that he had not accepted PAC 
money, which some interpreted as a “promise" to not to accept PAC money at all.57 
He ultimately accepted only about $100,000 less than Paulsen in PAC 
contributions, garnering critique from his opponent’s campaign despite his 
statements that it was never a promise.58 While this study looks specifically at 
individual contributions, breaking a statement like that can cause more attention 
to be directed towards funding overall. 
Perhaps the most interesting emphasis of funding in this race was a critique 
of Paulsen’s donation sources: he apparently accepted funding from a Republican 
                                                        
57 Targeted News Service. "Minnesota GOP: Ashwin Madia Running Away From 
Record". Targeted News Service. August 27, 2008 Wednesday 
58 Ibid 
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group who had raised money at a Las Vegas strip club.59 This accusation actually 
came from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and not from 
Madia, who later criticized the lack of integrity of the ad.60 Both candidates 
condemnation of the ad resulted in Paulsen not returning the donations, which 
shows that portrayal of donations is just as important as their actual sources; while 
the donations were from both outside the district and from a questionable source 
(particularly due to MN3’s reputation for being more conservative), it ultimately 
did not appear to cause too much negative impact despite media attention. This 
could also be attributed to Paulsen’s generally conservative viewpoints 
counteracting the harm done by money sourced from strip club attendees, but it is 
likely that since both candidates portrayed it as a non-issue, it did not see the same 
level of negative attention as seen in some of the cases of problematic funding 
sources from the previous cases. This is especially important since in contrast to 
this event, the election campaign as a whole was rampant with negative ads that 
promoted messages critiquing candidates rather than focusing on their policy or 
other aspects of the campaign. To drop the critique in the lens of donations is a 
very interesting deviation. 
                                                        
59 "Ramstad: Dems using 'gutter politics' in Minn.". The Associated Press State & Local Wire. October 
8, 2008 Wednesday.  
60 Ibid 
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DISCUSSION 
In reviewing both the quantitative and qualitative portions of data 
collection, it appears there are a number of mechanisms at play when it comes to 
the role of in-district donations in overall election outcomes. While the results 
found in the data analysis do not have a level of significance in which I am able to 
reject the null, the coefficients still hold true for this dataset itself. Does this 
potentially mean that for this data set, Republicans were more aware of campaign 
donations? Or possibly, that Democrats favor the idea of outside support while 
Republicans do not? Or perhaps both are unaware, and the insignificance 
demonstrated by the high p-value indicates a fluke? Assume for a moment that 
these findings have an inkling of significance—one might imagine that as the 
Conservative party, the Republicans would likely be more inclined to prefer those 
candidates who support home-grown, local community values, explaining why 
higher percentages of in-district are potentially more advantageous to them. In 
looking at the case studies, the Republican Peter Roskam ran his campaign on the 
idea that he was from the district and thus more familiar with its values. On the 
same vein, Democrat Mike Arcuri was critiqued for his donations from outsiders 
since they were from someone with policy interests that diverged from what might 
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be considered the norm for the district. Interestingly, in all three cases studied, 
which were selected due to media attention to campaign donations, Democrats 
had lower percentages of donations coming from inside the district than did their 
Republican opponents. This could perhaps offer a more partisan explanation—if 
Republicans can gain support from potential swing voters by pointing out that 
their opponent is receiving money from people with interests outside the district, 
yet do not risk the same impact if their donors find out theirs is not, or more 
common, more of their donations are from within the district to begin with, as is 
seen in the three cases, there is little reason to not use this as a talking point. With 
regard to risking their own odds, if translated into rhetoric, “Invading 
conservatives—coming in with their money and trying to return this place to what 
it used to be!” sounds far more ridiculous than “Invading liberals—coming in with 
their money and trying to promote their progressive agenda!” This could offer an 
explanation for why the results from the regression analysis demonstrated that in 
this particular dataset, higher in-district campaign donations resulted in positive 
odds for Republicans—while more outside donations could be a motivating force 
for more conservative swing voters to choose a Republican with more in-district 
support, Democrats may not care to the same degree. 
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The data still contributes to the notion that voters are likely unaware of 
information regarding campaign finance, particularly that relating to whether the 
source is within or outside of their district, because there was no significance 
observed in the quantitative analysis. That said, the findings of diverging 
directions of the logged odds for each party could be due to an alternative factor. 
Since I only observed open races, which eliminated the incumbent advantage, it is 
possible that these districts saw and influx of investment from the supporters of 
the Parties where they saw a possibility of gaining a seat. The fact that the “party 
stronghold” control variable saw significance in each regression contributes to this 
argument; there was a negative impact on the likelihood of a candidate winning if 
the district’s former Congressmember was of the same party as the candidate, and 
this negative effect was even more potent with Democrats. In the case of the Party 
fearing a loss of the seat, it is likely that more contributions to those campaigns 
would be made in an effort to maintain that seat, especially since 2006 was a 
midterm election, where there is generally a flip in which party controls the 
House.61 That would be reason enough for more money to be directed towards any 
district where there is the possibility of a Democrat winning, even if that chance is 
                                                        
61 Samuel Kernell, "Presidential popularity and negative voting: An alternative explanation of the 
midterm congressional decline of the president's party," American Political Science Review 71, no. 1 
(1977): 44-66. 
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slim. Since Republicans have less trouble mobilizing voters than Democrats, that, 
in theory, would promote more donations to Democratic campaigns in an attempt 
to possibly break this via an increase in visibility of the candidate, even if the 
election is up-in-the-air with regard to which way it will go. In looking at the case 
studies, in Case 1 and Case 3, both Democrats had considerably lower percentages 
of in-district donations, and both Republicans won. Previous studies 
demonstrated that more money means a higher likelihood of winning,62 so for a 
race such as that in Case 1, the close margins of Duckworth’s loss show a divide 
in the district. Had she not received such a high level of outside funding, would 
Roskam have won by a greater margin? Perhaps this offers a fuller explanation 
than what the quantitative analysis alone can tell us. 
With regard to an overall assessment independent from party, I still once 
again start from the point of lacking statistical significance in the quantitative data. 
Pairing previous findings with evidence in the case studies, people do appear to 
care about where a candidate’s donations are coming from, but they have to be 
made aware of it. The three cases that were studied were selected because they 
had the most media coverage regarding campaign finance of all of the races 
observed in the quantitative section, and compared to other issue areas, even this 
                                                        
62 See the “Campaign Finance” section for references and explanation of this effect 
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coverage was minimal. That indicates that the overall coverage of campaign 
finance for the data assessed was very small, which would explain a lack of 
significance in the quantitative findings. Without asking people, there is no way 
to know if campaign finance was something they even considered in their choice 
of who to vote for, even if media coverage is observed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While the lack of statistical significance in the quantitative analysis 
prevented the rejection of the null hypothesis, this analysis offered important 
information in terms of what should be targeted and observed moving forward. 
By the findings related to party difference, those seeking to further research the 
topic of the role of percentage of in-district donations on election outcomes know 
to pay attention to the effects of partisanship, both in addressing the proportions 
of donations coming from inside and outside the district, as well as how much the 
voters potentially care about the issue. Moreover, this study illustrates the 
importance of voter knowledge and psychology; media reliance can take a toll 
both on what voters know and how much they care about it. This could provide 
useful insight to candidates by offering a minimally-tapped issue area that could 
actually impact voters. 
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Extensions of this study could be examining the role of PAC donations in 
the same context—perhaps there is more media coverage or general awareness 
surrounding these interest groups than there are surrounding individual 
contribution. Moreover, with the advent of super PACs, which Americans fear due 
to their allowance of big money influence, there are even more factors than merely 
individual donations and interest groups that operate separately from a campaign 
but can still have considerable impact. Following the direction of the 2019 
Presidential contenders, I imagine that campaign finance will become a much 
greater focus over time. Replicating this study for more recent elections could 
provide very different results, whether that is due to more media coverage or just 
more voters paying attention to where a candidate’s money is coming from. 
Regardless, as fear of campaign donations and influence of “big money” grows, 
interest this aspect of campaigning is sure to grow as well, including attention to 
whether or not donors are located, perhaps, within a candidate’s district. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Stata Do-Files: 
First Regression 
1 #delimit ;   
2    
3 rename decidonationsfromwithindistrict per_don_dis ; 
4 sum per_don_dis, detail ;  
5 tab year, generate(years) ; 
6 rename years1 y2004 ;  
7 rename years2 y2006 ;  
8 rename years3 y2008 ;  
9 sum per_don_dis , detail ; 
10 logit win_code per_don_dis ; 
11 logistic win_code per_don_dis ; 
12 
logit win_code per_don_dis party_code party_match y2004 
y2006 ; 
13 gender_code totaldonations ; 
14 
logistic win_code per_don_dis party_code party_match 
y2004 y2006 ; 
15 gender_code totaldonations ; 
 
Party Regressions 
 
1 #delimit ; 
2  
3 rename decidonationsfromwithindistrict per_don_dis ; 
4 tab year, generate(year) ; 
5 rename year1 y2004 ; 
6 rename year2 y2006 ; 
7 rename year3 y2008 ; 
8 sum per_don_dis , detail ; 
9 logit win_code per_don_dis ; 
10 logistic win_code per_don_dis ; 
11 logit win_code per_don_dis party_match y2004 y2006  
12 gender_code totaldonations ; 
13 logistic win_code per_don_dis party_match y2004 y2006 ; 
14 gender_code totaldonations ; 
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Full Dataset on House Candidates: 
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Braley, 
Bruce 
M 2006 IA 1 D D W 1457662 98517.41 0.0676 6.76% 
Lipinski, 
Dan 
M 2004 IL 3 D D W 98600 43175 0.4379 43.79% 
Hare, Phil M 2006 IL 17 D D W 253609.5 78393.53 0.3091 30.91% 
Ellison, 
Keith 
M 2006 MN 5 D D W 354050.5 149297.2 0.4217 42.17% 
Carnahan, 
Russ 
M 2004 MO 3 D D W 1086054 424755.9 0.3911 39.11% 
Cleaver, 
Emanuel 
M 2004 MO 5 D D W 981851.2 645573.7 0.6575 65.75% 
Wilson, 
Charlie 
M 2006 OH 6 D D W 542059.9 244639.9 0.4513 45.13% 
Sutton, 
Betty 
F 2006 OH 13 D D W 481605.2 119020.8 0.2471 24.71% 
Fudge, 
Marcia 
F 2008 OH 11 D D W 103955.8 51945.29 0.4997 49.97% 
Moore, 
Gwen 
F 2004 WI 4 D D W 233624.8 76230 0.3263 32.63% 
Duckworth, 
Tammy 
F 2006 IL 6 D R L 2544861 147075 0.0578 5.78% 
Halvorson, 
Debbie 
F 2008 IL 11 D R W 1075017 169515.1 0.1577 15.77% 
Callahan, 
Colleen 
F 2008 IL 18 D R L 230358.1 122859.1 0.5333 53.33% 
Renier, 
Sharon 
Marie 
F 2004 MI 7 D R L 2100 1100 0.5238 52.38% 
Wetterling, 
Patty 
F 2006 MN 6 D R L 354050.5 29875 0.0844 8.44% 
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Madia, 
Ashwin 
M 2008 MN 3 D R L 1672495 404144.5 0.2416 24.16% 
Baker, 
Judy 
F 2008 MO 9 D R L 790986.2 391058.4 0.4944 49.44% 
Connealy, 
Matt 
M 2004 NE 1 D R L 334003.5 164769 0.4933 49.33% 
Kleeb, 
Scott 
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